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DISCUSSION
The Petitioners, Jason Cross et al., by and through undersigned
counsel, hereby state the following in reply to Facebook, Inc.’s Answer to
Petition for Review and in support of the Petitioners’ Petition for Review to
the Supreme Court for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, issued on August 9, 2017. The Respondent only raised
four issues in its Answer, which the Petitioners reply to in order. (See
Answer at 19-31).
I. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE
ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16)
APPLIES TO CAUSES OF ACTION THAT ARE NOT BASED ON
THE DEFENDANT’S FREE SPEECH
California’s anti-SLAPP statute states: “A cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution . . . .” (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(b)(1).) The
statute states that it pertains to “any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech.” (Id. [emphasis added].) The
Petitioners have sought review of whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to
the case at bar, even though (1) the claims were based on contractual rights,
publicity rights, and negligence, rather than defamation or the Respondent’s
free speech rights and (2) the free speech at issue was that of third parties and
not the Respondent. (See Petition at 8-12.)
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The Respondent, however, has stated that this review is not
worthwhile. (See Answer at 19-23.) The Respondent summarily states that
the anti-SLAPP statute applies to all of the causes of action and then cites the
Court of Appeal reasoning of which the Petitioners presently request review.
(Id. at 20-21.) While the Respondent cites three non-Supreme Court cases
in support of its opinion that the breach of contract claim was actually about
the Respondent furthering its own free speech, the Respondent fails to even
mention why the statute should apply to the publicity rights, unfair trade
practices, and negligence-based causes of action. (See id. at 19-23 [citing
Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2014) 742 F.3d 414, 424-25; Hupp v. Freedom Communications,
Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 398, 403; Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Data
Base, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 947].)
At most, the Respondent’s free speech would be incidental subject
matter to the breach of contract claim and would be largely, if not wholly,
irrelevant to proving breach of contract, publicity rights, unfair trade
practices, and negligence-based causes of actions. The Petitioners find it
revealing that the Respondent, while addressing the breach of contract claim,
has not even argued why the anti-SLAPP should apply to all six causes of
action. (See Answer at 19-23.)
The Petitioners believe that the anti-SLAPP statute requiring private
citizens to pay the copious attorney’s fees of global corporations, such as the
2

Respondent, for claims such as breach of contract, publicity rights
deprivations, unfair trade practices, and negligence whenever anyone’s
speech is even remotely involved would be a distortion of the meaning and
purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute.

(See Code of Civil Procedure

§ 425.16(b)(1) [stating that the statute applies to “[a] cause of action against
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s
right of petition or free speech . . .”] [emphasis added].) Therefore, the
Petitioners believe that it is critical for the Supreme Court to review the
applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute to matters such as the case at bar
because the current precedent now set forth by the Court of Appeal that
allows large corporations to collect attorney fees from private citizens for
these basic causes of action will severely chill the ability of citizens to
petition for the redress of their grievances, which is exactly the purpose that
the Legislature intended for the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Code of Civil
Procedure § 425.16(a) [stating the enormous importance of “the valid
exercise of constitutional rights [to] petition for the redress of grievances”
and that the legislature declared “that it is in the public interest to encourage
continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this
participation should not be chilled through abuse of judicial process.”]; see
also Petition at 9-12.) As the Petition and Answer have shown, there is
limited case law to guide citizens in this matter and the Petitioners believe
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that it is ripe for the California Supreme Court to review this important matter
of public interest. (See Petition at 8-12; Answer at 19-23).
II. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (47 U.S.C. § 230) BARS NONDEFAMATORY CLAIMS BASED ON AN INTERACTIVE
COMPUTER SERVICES PROVIDER’S OWN ACTIONS
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) states: “No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).) The Petitioners sought to hold the
Respondent responsible for its own actions and, therefore, filed breach of
contract, negligent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation with
business relations, deprivation of publicity rights, and unfair trade practices
claims. The Petitioners only sought to hold the Respondent liable for its own
actions in this case and, therefore, neither sued any third party nor filed any
defamation-based claims. The Court of Appeal, however, concluded that the
Petitioner’s breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent
interference with business relations causes of actions were barred by the
CDA because they treated the Respondent as the “publisher or speaker” of
“information provided by another content provider.” (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1);
see Opn. at 15.)
The Respondent also concluded that it was being treated as the
publisher or speaker of another information content provider’s information
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and, therefore, was immune from the Petitioners’ breach of contract,
negligent misrepresentation, and negligence interference with business
relations causes of action.

(See Answer at 24-25.)

It seems wholly

inconsistent that the Respondent claims that it is the speaker of content on its
internet site for anti-SLAPP purposes, but then contradictorily claims that it
is in no way the speaker of content for CDA purposes. (Id. at 19-26.) In
any regard, a CDA analysis in the present context seems largely, if not
wholly, independent from proving the present causes of action.

The

Petitioners sought to hold the Respondent liable for its own actions, namely
whether the Respondent made and breached a contract, negligently
misrepresented, or negligently interfered with business relations. These
claims are independent of the CDA because these common causes of action
did not seek to hold the Respondent liable for being the publisher of another’s
content, but rather merely responsible for its own actions.
Allowing an interactive computer service provider to make and breach
contracts, negligently misrepresent, or negligently interfere with the business
relations of citizens and then use CDA immunity so that the citizens cannot
even bring forth those claims is a very important public matter. The Court
of Appeal’s ruling would seem to be antithetical to the CDA and laws of
California. It is important to remember that the present discussion refers to
immunity, meaning whether or not a potential plaintiff can even pursue
redress for certain grievances in court. Immunity means that the Respondent
5

could actually breach contracts, negligently misrepresent, and negligently
interfere with business relations and not be liable. Unless the Supreme Court
reviews this case, the current precedent from the Court of Appeal would
allow this to happen. Petitioners believe that it is a matter of great public
concern and ripe for the Supreme Court to review how citizens can petition
for the redress of their grievances via basic causes of action, such as breach
of contract and negligence-based claims. Petitioners believe that this new
precedent grants extremely broad immunity to corporations such as the
Respondent in a manner that contradicts the meaning of the CDA and would
prevent many citizens from receiving redress for legitimate claims. (See
Petition at 13.)
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE
STATUTORY DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY CAUSE
OF ACTION (CIVIL CODE § 3344) SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN
THIS MODERN INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICES AND
INTERNET ADVERTISING CONTEXT
California’s right of publicity law states: “Any person who knowingly
uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise,
goods or services, without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for
any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”
(Civil Code § 3344.) The Petitioners have stated that this matter is very
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important and ripe for review by the Supreme Court, particularly with regard
to the Code’s meaning of “knowing use” of another’s publicity rights “in any
manner . . . for purposes of advertising.” (Id.; see Petition at 17.)
The Respondent readily concludes that this important area of law,
particularly in the modern technological context, has no need for a
declaration by the Supreme Court. (See Answer at 27-30.) To support its
conclusion, however, the Respondent offers no Supreme Court precedent on
point. (Id.) The Respondent merely cites non-Supreme Court cases to
support uncontroverted basic statutory requirements, such as the “use”
requirement, and fails to accurately acknowledge or comprehend the
Petitioners’ legitimate request that the Supreme Court determine the meaning
of the statutory language as applied to this modern technological context.
(See Id. at 27 [citing Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. (1995) 34
Cal.App.4th 790, 793; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 30,
2010), No. CV 04-9484 AHM SHX, 2010 WL 9479060 at *13].) The
Petitioners likewise find it interesting that the Respondent argues that the
Respondent had no responsibility or involvement with the internet content in
the publicity rights context, yet argues that the same content constituted its
own free speech in the anti-SLAPP context. (See Answer at 19-30.)
The Petitioners properly alleged its rights of publicity cause of action
and seek to hold the Respondent responsible for its actions. The Respondent
used the Petitioners’ publicity rights for advertising revenue and thus
7

violated Civil Code § 334. These violations contained “knowing use” both
because Petitioner Cross specifically contacted the Respondent about the
content and the Respondent’s advertising methods have become increasingly
sophisticated in the modern context. Currently, parties seemingly must look
to the non-binding 2010 federal district court case Perfect 10, which is likely
premised on outdated factual premises, for instruction in this regard. It is
clear that the time is ripe for Supreme Court review of Civil Code § 334.
(See Perfect 10 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010) No. CV 04-9484 AHM SHX, 2010
WL 9479060 at *13.)
IV. ALL LEGAL ISSUES ARE RIPE FOR REVIEW
The crux of the Respondent’s Answer is that the relevant areas of law
are “well-established.” (See Answer at 19 [“established law”], 22 [“clear
case law”], 24 [“established law”], 26 [“well-established law”], 27 [“wellsettled law”], 28 [“uncontroversial conclusion”], 30-31 [“well-established
principles of law”].) Yet, it seems that the Respondent was unable to find
Supreme Court cases that supported its substantive conclusions that these
areas of law are well-established. (Id.) In fact, it seems that in the Court of
Appeal opinion, the Petition for Review, and the Answer to Petition for
Review, there were very few citations to any Supreme Court cases, and, in
the Petitioners’ opinion, there were no Supreme Court cases that were
directly on point. This seems to be very telling and bolsters the Petitioners’
request to the Supreme Court for its review to settle these very important
8

matters of law. Of course, even if the Supreme Court had previously declared
on a matter, it could review its reasoning and precedent, yet even that does
not seem to be the situation with the present legal issues.
At multiple points in its Answer, the Respondent stated that the
Petitioners should have petitioned the Court of Appeal for a rehearing and
that a factual record would be needed for review of the matters set forth in
the Petition. (See Answer at 18, 22-23, 29.) The Petitioners have only sought
review of legal issues that were declared upon by the Court of Appeal.
Furthermore, the Petitioners seek, on remand, the opportunity to have their
claims persist at the superior court so that they can pursue relevant discovery.
It is common knowledge that the multi-billion-dollar company that is
Facebook, Inc., receives much internet advertising revenue from its very
intentional and particularized advertising platforms. Facebook, Inc., does
not charge for its basic services, yet has massive revenue due to its use of
other persons’ intellectual property, which creates enormous internet traffic
to its site and customers for its advertisements. The extent of these activities
as determined by factual finding at the superior court would be necessary to
determine specific calculations such as monetary damages from the
deprivation of publicity rights in the case at bar. At the present time, the
Petitioners have only sought review of legal issues that are indeed ripe for
review by the Supreme Court.
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CONCLUSION
The matters in the case at bar are essential for the people of the State
of California and the United States of America as a whole. Currently, the
Petitioner believes that precedent has been made that would chill citizens’
attempts to petition for the redress of their grievances if they are forced to
pay the large attorney fees of internet companies via the anti-SLAPP statute,
immunize these companies from basic breach of contract and negligencebased claims via the Communications Decency Act, and allow widespread
deprivations of publicity rights. The Petitioner additionally believes that this
current precedent bolsters Facebook, Inc.’s inconsistent positions that it is
the speaker of content for anti-SLAPP purposes, but should not be treated as
the speaker or publisher for CDA purposes and in no way has knowing use
of this content for publicity rights purposes, even though it uses the content
to gain advertising revenue. Thus, there are important questions of law for
which the Supreme Court can provide clarity and consistency. For these and
the aforementioned reasons in the Petition for Review, the Petitioners
respectfully ask the Supreme Court to settle the important questions of law
contained herein.
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